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Abstract 
This paper draws together themes from work at the RBA, other national central 
banks, the BIS and elsewhere on recent developments in housing and housing 
finance. The general conclusion is that financial and macroeconomic developments 
have increased the demand for the stock of housing. Because the stock of housing 
is inherently slow to adjust, this has increased its relative price. Although this is a 
global trend, individual country institutions have affected outcomes, sometimes in 
ways that are not obvious. The resulting expansion in both sides of the household 
balance sheet is an important development for policy-makers to monitor, but it is 
probably not of itself a cause of financial instability. 
JEL Classification Numbers: E21, E44, R21 
Keywords: housing, housing finance, economic geography, cross-country ii 
Table of Contents 
1.  Introduction 1 
2.  Global Trends  2 
2.1  Disinflation, Deregulation and Financial Innovation  2 
2.2  Mortgage Tilt and Disinflation  4 
2.3  Supply of Housing is Inherently Sticky  6 
2.4  Result: Higher Housing Prices  8 
3.  National Features  10 
3.1  Tax System  10 
3.2  Structure of the Financial System  13 
3.3  Legal System and Housing Policy  17 
3.4  Geographical Features  20 
4.  Policy Issues  24 
4.1  Need for More and Different Data  25 
4.2  Old Rules of Thumb for Balance Sheets Might be Misleading  26 
4.3  Limited Effect of Extra Marginal Supply  27 
4.4  Rising Indebtedness  29 
References 31 
 HOUSING AND HOUSING FINANCE:  
THE VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA AND BEYOND 
Luci Ellis 
1.  Introduction 
This paper presents a synthesis of the substantial recent work by central banks and 
other agencies covering developments in housing and housing finance in 
industrialised economies over the past decade or so. Most countries have 
experienced waves of financial deregulation, increased competition amongst 
providers of finance and greater innovation in the provision of finance to 
households. Together with the effect of lower inflation on nominal interest rates, 
these developments have increased the supply of credit and supported increased 
household demand for the stock of housing. Because the supply of housing is 
inherently slow to adjust, housing prices have risen significantly in many countries. 
Both sides of the household balance sheet have expanded substantially as a result. 
Against the background of these global trends, differences in national features can 
affect outcomes in a variety of ways. The tax system can clearly have an effect, as 
can the structure and regulation of the financial system. National housing policy 
and regulation of the landlord–tenant relationship can affect incentives to hold 
housing as an investment. These institutional features can vary substantially across 
different countries, but they can also be changed. Less changeable are geographic 
features, which could also affect outcomes in particular markets. This means that 
countries with similar institutions can still have quite different experiences. 
Increases in housing prices and household indebtedness naturally raise concerns 
for policy-makers. They need to assess if either the household or financial sectors 
are taking on too much risk, and what the macroeconomic results of these 
developments might be. It is therefore important to ensure that the best available 
data are used to analyse these issues, particularly as other observers will try to push 
their preferred solutions. Overall, it seems unlikely that the household sector would 
spontaneously contract their liabilities and bring about a slowing in overall 
economic growth. But if a macroeconomic downturn occurs when balance sheets 
are stretched, the response of highly leveraged households could exacerbate it. 2 
The structure of this paper follows the above discussion. The next section describes 
the common factors and global trends affecting housing and housing finance, 
drawing heavily from BIS  (2006). Section 3 outlines some of the national and 
institutional details that can affect outcomes in particular countries. The policy 
questions and conclusions are discussed in Section 4. 
2.  Global Trends 
2.1  Disinflation, Deregulation and Financial Innovation  
One of the most important common factors driving housing developments 
internationally has been the wave of deregulation and product innovation taking 
place in financial sectors in most countries. This has reduced interest margins on 
housing loans, lowering real interest rates paid by mortgage borrowers. Greater 
competition and product innovation has also encouraged lenders to make finance 
available to a wider range of potential borrowers than before. At the same time, 
declines in inflation in a number of countries over the past decade and a half have 
lowered nominal interest rates, thereby magnifying these effects.  
A BIS working group on housing finance recently drew some of this evidence 
together (BIS 2006).1 The main theme of the findings of that group was that 
globalisation of financial markets, and particularly innovations in funding and risk 
management, had resulted in a substantial expansion in the supply of mortgage 
loans. Table 1 summarises some of the major developments across countries. 
As an illustration of the role of increased competition in lowering mortgage 
interest rates, Figure  1 shows the evolving difference between indicator rates 
advertised by Australian lenders, and the rates that borrowers actually pay. So-
called mortgage managers entered the market in the mid 1990s, funded via 
wholesale markets and securitisation. As shown in the figure, they were initially 
offering rates that were well below the standard variable interest rate advertised by 
the major Australian banks. The banks were forced to respond to this competition, 
and margins on mortgage rates relative to the cash rate narrowed considerably over 
                                           
1  For more details on the housing finance systems of the individual countries represented in the 
working group, see the supplementary material posted with BIS (2006). 
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this period. Since then the indicator rates advertised by the two classes of lender 
have shown a reasonably stable spread, but the prevalence of discounting from 
these rates has increased. Data on the average rate new borrowers actually pay are 
only available with a lag, but show that this rate is now below the average standard 
variable rates of all major lenders. Lower mortgage interest margins increase 
borrowers’ capacity to pay at any given level of the policy interest rate, and at the 
same time make mortgage borrowing accessible to a wider range of households, 
for a given level of housing prices.  
Table 1: Recent Developments in Housing Finance 
Country Change  Result 
Australia  Flexible mortgages with variable 
repayments; home equity lines of 
credit; redraw and offset accounts; 
split-purpose loans 
Flexibility of payments; increases 
capacity to pay and provides tax-
effective precautionary saving 
  Low-documentation loans  Finance accessible to self-employed and 
others unable to document their income 
France  Variable payment mortgages  Flexibility of payments 
Germany  Consolidation of mortgage bond 
legislation  
Possible expansion in funding for 
borrowers with enough equity 
Netherlands Savings/equity loans (endowment 
mortgages) 
Accumulation of assets with potentially 
higher post-tax return than (deductible) 
mortgage interest rate; conveys tax 
advantages 
NZ  Increased competition; expansion 
in fixed-rate loans 
Reduction in interest margins; increased 
capacity to pay 
Sweden  ECB policy rate tracker  Little change; some loans less linked to 
domestic monetary policy 
Switzerland Little  change in already diverse 
range of products 
– 
UK  Flexible mortgages; offset accounts  Flexibility of payments; increased 
capacity to pay 
US  Interest-only loans; option 
adjustable-rate loans; negative 
amortisation loans 
Reduces initial repayment burden of 
larger mortgages (but risk of sudden 
increases); increases capacity to pay 
Sources:   adapted from BIS (2006) and national sources 
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Notes: (a)  Standard  variable 
  (b) Based on securitised housing loans data, between 1997–1999 estimate based on banks’ discount only 
Source: RBA 
2.2  Mortgage Tilt and Disinflation 
An important part of this increased capacity to pay reflects nominal developments, 
not just real ones such as the squeezing of interest margins on mortgage loans. It is 
well-known that lending markets involve information asymmetries, so lenders do 
not know exactly who the good credit risks are. One way lenders traditionally dealt 
with this is that they imposed lending limits based on repayment ratios. That is, 
they determined how much they would lend to a particular borrower by working 
out the ratio of the initial required repayment to the borrower’s income. The ratio 
was chosen to ensure that the repayment was a manageable obligation for a well-
intentioned borrower. One consequence of this credit-rationing practice is that, 
because the nominal interest rate determines the size of the repayment (not the real 
interest rate), it also determines the maximum loan size granted. 
A substantial disinflation therefore increases borrowers’ capacity to pay by 
reducing nominal rates even when real rates remain constant. This seems to have 
been an important driver of the increased average sizes of new mortgages and 
higher housing prices in a number of countries. Australia and New Zealand were 
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particularly affected by this process given the extent of the reduction in inflation 
that occurred in these two countries in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of this on the maximum loan size available to a potential 
borrower. The top two panels present the standard characteristics of a fixed-term 
amortising (credit-foncier) loan: the amount outstanding declines at an increasing 
rate, as the interest component of the constant total repayment falls and the share 
that goes to pay off the principal can therefore rise. 
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Source: adapted  from  Ellis  (2005) 
The bottom two panels of Figure 2 show the effects of disinflation. The line in the 
left-hand panel traces out the loan sizes that generate the same repayment as for a 
loan of $100 000 at 10 per cent interest per annum, paid monthly over 20 years. In 
other words, if the borrower could afford a loan of $100 000 when the interest rate 
was 10 per cent, she could afford to service a loan of nearly $160 000 if rates were 
to fall to 4 per cent. This relationship is slightly non-linear but less than 
proportionate to the change in the interest rate. In other words, a fall in rates from  
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6 per cent to 5 per cent makes more difference than one from 10 per cent to   
9 per cent, but halving the interest rate less than doubles the maximum loan size. 
This effect also means that the higher nominal interest rates are, the more front-
loaded the repayment burden; this front-loading is known as mortgage tilt. This is 
shown in the lower right-hand panel of Figure 2: assuming lower inflation implies 
lower nominal income growth, the repayment-income ratio diminishes more 
gradually. It is not clear if household behaviour fully adjusts to this fact after a 
disinflation. It may take time for them to recognise that the burden of a given 
repayment stays high for longer when inflation, and thus nominal income growth, 
is low (see Modigliani 1976 and Stevens 1997 for more discussion of this point). 
The net result of this property of amortising loans is that as inflation falls, 
aggregate debt-income ratios rise. This occurs partly because capacity to pay has 
risen substantially, and partly because the ratio of remaining debt to income falls 
more slowly over the life of each individual loan. Earlier Bank work (RBA 2003a) 
shows the effect of changes in nominal rates and income growth on the equilibrium 
aggregate debt-income ratio for the whole household sector, given various 
assumptions; Ellis (2005) presents an analytical expression for the same ratio. 
2.3  Supply of Housing is Inherently Sticky 
The combination of disinflation, deregulation and financial innovation can 
generate a substantial boost to the supply of housing loans, thereby stimulating the 
demand for housing. For example, the data presented in Figure 2 showed that a fall 
in inflation and interest margins similar to that experienced in Australia over the 
1990s could increase individual homebuyers’ capacity to pay by as much as   
60 per cent. While not everyone will increase their borrowings immediately, many 
first-home buyers and existing owners have availed themselves of their greater 
borrowing capacity over time.2 Thus demand for housing in dollar terms could 
increase by this order of magnitude within a few years. 
                                           
2  Some older households that own their homes outright are probably less affected by this 
change in incentives, but most existing owners have the option to refinance or renovate even 
if they do not move. 
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It seems reasonable at this point to ask why households would increase their 
mortgage to the full extent of the expansion in their capacity to pay, rather than 
using some of the savings from lower mortgage repayments to purchase other 
goods and services. One reason might be that households have preferences such 
that they maintain their expenditure shares constant as relative prices shift; a Cobb-
Douglas utility function would have this characteristic. In the context of housing, 
they would then maintain their mortgage repayments (flow of expenditure) 
constant as a fraction of income when interest rates changed, and expand their 
borrowings one-for-one with their increased capacity to do so. A more compelling 
reason might be that households remain credit-constrained even after some 
relaxation of these constraints, so they would still choose to borrow up to the 
maximum allowable. 
The supply of housing is inherently slow to adjust, and would certainly not be able 
to adjust quickly to a surge in demand of this size. The increase in demand is for 
the whole housing stock, because it affects (almost) the whole household sector. 
The available supply of housing is the existing stock, which is fixed, plus whatever 
building and renovating work is done over a given period. So the only increment to 
supply is the flow of new dwellings and renovations of existing dwellings, which 
represents just a few percentage points of the size of the stock (Table 2).3 Even the 
most flexible and least regulated construction sector would struggle to lift its 
output from something equal to a few percentage points of the dwelling stock to 
accommodate a surge in demand of 50 per cent or more.  
Table 2: Stock and Flow Supply of Housing 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
Country  Value of dwelling stock  Dwelling investment 
 1990  2005  1990  2005 
Australia 190  301  5.1  6.6 
NZ 172  328  4.8  6.7 
US 113  156  3.9  6.2 
Sources:   Australian Bureau of Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bureau of Economic
Analysis; RBA; Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ); Statistics New Zealand; author’s calculations 
 
                                           
3  These figures exclude depreciation and demolitions, so the net new supply of housing services 
is even smaller relative to the stock than is shown in Table 2. 
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It is therefore inevitable that housing prices would rise in the face of such a surge 
in demand. Part of this would take the form of higher building costs as renovation 
work increases, and part would reflect a higher average quality of dwelling as the 
stock gets renovated. But much of it would feed through to the price of existing, 
unrenovated dwellings, and implicitly the price of land. Transactions in the market 
should be expected to rise, as households try to express their increased demand for 
housing services by moving to a more desirable location. 
Comparatively little of the increased supply would take the form of additional new 
dwellings. Household formation rates may well increase in the face of an increase 
in the capacity to pay, but this would be a small effect compared with a change in 
the demand for housing services by existing households.4 This also demonstrates 
the importance of distinguishing between the number of dwellings and the average 
quality of those dwellings when trying to disentangle supply of, and demand for, 
housing. Adding a large number of extra houses of a given quality does little to 
meet the demand of existing households for a higher-quality home than they 
already have. 
2.4  Result: Higher Housing Prices 
The increase in the relative price of housing that occurs as a result of such an 
increase in demand is in large part an equilibrium phenomenon. The average 
quality of housing will rise over time and absorb some of the increase in demand, 
but this should be expected to take a very long time. And even once this process 
has worked through, median and average house prices will be higher because 
average quality has risen.5
                                           
4  Increased household formation from an existing population may actually reduce average 
demand for housing services a little, since it would reduce the average number of persons per 
household. 
5  The desire for higher housing services, and resulting higher average quality of dwellings, will 
also be picked up in repeat-sales indices and price indices based on hedonics. This is because 
it is not possible to have complete information about all the characteristics of a property that 
affect the price, and which can be changed in a renovation. 
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Figure 3: Real Housing Prices 























Source:  national sources via BIS 
Figure 4: Household Debt 
























Source:  national sources via BIS 
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Both sides of the household balance sheet will expand relative to income as a result 
of this transition. Assuming households own most of the dwelling stock, either as 
owner-occupiers or landlords, the value of their holdings of housing assets will 
increase as prices rise. The amount of debt funding should also be expected to 
increase relative to income in order to fund this more expensive housing, even if 
the gearing on these housing assets does not rise much. This certainly seems to 
have been the experience in Australia, as well as in a number of other countries. 
Housing prices have risen much faster than consumer prices in many countries 
over the past decade (Figure 3) and ratios of debt to income have also increased 
(Figure 4; see also Debelle 2004). 
However, the nature of the transitions can vary a lot between countries, for 
example in terms of their speed and duration. The consequences have also varied: 
some of these transitions (UK in the late 1980s, Netherlands in the late 1990s, US 
and, arguably, Spain in the early 2000s) were associated with significant increases 
in the owner-occupation rate. Others have tended to squeeze out first-home buyers, 
perhaps reducing ownership rates in younger age groups a little; the recent 
episodes in Australia and the UK seem to be examples of this. Likewise, some of 
these transitions have involved a speculative element, driven by investors’ 
expectations of future capital gains, resulting in a boom/bust cycle, while others 
seem to have involved little speculation activity. These differences probably reflect 
the many national differences between housing markets. The next section discusses 
these differences in detail, along with their probable effects on the expansion in 
housing demand seen across many countries over the past decade or so. 
3.  National Features 
3.1  Tax System 
Housing is both an asset and a source of housing services (imputed income), and it 
can be owned either by the occupier or a landlord. Therefore the tax system can 
affect behaviour in the housing market in multiple ways and at multiple points in 
the life-cycle of ownership. Some relevant features are summarised in Table 3. 
One set of taxes can affect a household’s decision of whether and when to transact  
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Table 3: Features of Taxation Systems Relevant to Housing Markets 
Country Mortgage 
deductibility 






 Owner  Investor    Owner  Investor Owner Investor  Investor Investor
Australia No  Yes    No  ½  rate
(c) Limited Yes  Yes Yes
(d)
Canada No  Yes    No  ½  rate
(c) Yes Yes  Yes
(e) Yes 
France No  Yes    No  No
(f) Limited Limited  Limited
(g) Yes 
Germany No  No    No
(f) No
(f) Limited Limited  Yes  Yes 
Netherlands
(a) Yes na    na  na  Yes  Yes  na  No 
NZ No  Yes    No  No  Limited  Limited  Yes  Yes 
Sweden Yes  Yes    Limited  Limited Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Switzerland
(b) Yes Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Outlays
US Yes  Yes    Limited  Yes  Yes  Yes  Limited
(h) Yes 
UK No  Yes    No  Yes  Limited  Yes  No  No 
Notes:  Under CGT, ‘limited’ means homeowners may defer payment provided the proceeds of sale are
reinvested in housing. Under land/property tax, ‘limited’ refers to property owner charges along the lines
of council rates, which are linked to local services and need not move proportionately with property
values. 
  (a) The Netherlands levies a tax on net wealth using an assumed rate of return, so negative gearing is not 
possible. 
  (b) Swiss homeowners pay tax on imputed rental income, net of interest and renovation costs. 
  (c) CGT is levied in Australia and Canada at half the taxpayer’s marginal rate if the holding period
exceeds one year, but in Canada gains resulting from changes in the cost base due to depreciation are
levied at the full rate. 
  (d) For buildings constructed after 1985. 
  (e) Only cash expenses, not depreciation, can be negatively geared in Canada. 
  (f) Provided property owned for at least 15 years (France) or 10 years (Germany). 
  (g) Negative gearing allowed up to a set limit and interest costs may not exceed gross rent. 
  (h)  Rental property expenses cannot be deducted against unrelated labour income in the US, which 
effectively limits negative gearing to professional investors and developers.  
Sources:  adapted from BIS (2006); Ellis and Andrews (2001); RBA (2003b); Scanlon and Whitehead (2004) with 
some updating from national sources. 
 
in the housing market; that is, how often they buy or sell property. For example, a 
transaction tax (stamp duty) affects turnover directly by fixing a wedge between 
prices paid by buyers and returns received by sellers. This limits buyers’ capacity 
to pay by increasing the ‘deposit gap’ between feasible borrowings and the total 
cost of the dwelling (RBA 2003b). It also limits the incentive to turn properties 
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over frequently, reducing the extent to which an upswing in housing prices can 
attract speculative demand aimed at short-term capital gains.6
Capital gains taxes (CGT), with exemptions or concessions for assets held for 
longer holding periods, may also influence speculative demand. For example, the 
half marginal rate paid on capital gains in Australia refers to assets held for at least 
a year; assets held for less than this period attract CGT at the full marginal rate. In 
France and Germany the required holding periods to obtain concessional taxation 
of capital gains are considerably longer, having been extended from two years to 
ten years in Germany in 1998 (Scanlon and Whitehead 2004). 
More generally, capital gains taxes influence the incentive to invest in residential 
property and other gains-producing assets such as equities, relative to assets that 
provide an income flow alone. This is particularly pertinent given that purchase of 
real estate is often highly geared, partly because interest payments for mortgages 
on rental properties can be written off as an expense against tax in most 
jurisdictions. The tax regime in Australia is usually considered to be among the 
most generous towards individual landlords, offering concessional taxation of 
capital gains relative to income flows, and the ability to negatively gear expenses 
against other income, including non-cash depreciation expenses. This has been 
previously identified as a factor encouraging small-investor participation in the 
housing market in Australia, particularly in an environment of rising prices   
(RBA 2003b; BIS 2006). On the other hand, some studies have argued that certain 
segments of Australian landlords – mainly those renting to low-income   
households – face higher effective tax rates than landlords in the UK, even though 
the UK tax system does not permit negative gearing (Wood and Kemp 2003). 
A second set of taxation arrangements can influence the funding of home 
purchases. Mortgage interest deductibility affects the capacity to service debt and 
the incentives to repay principal. This in turn affects incentives to take mortgages 
with fixed versus variable interest rates. When interest payments are not 
deductible, mortgage borrowers are effectively paying their mortgage out of post-
                                           
6  Transaction taxes or stamp duties apply to property sales in most of the countries listed in 
Table  3, but the rates usually do not have simple relationships to sale price. Real estate 
agents’ fees and other administrative costs can reinforce the effects of transaction taxes, 
together adding as much as 10–15  per cent to the purchase price in some European 
jurisdictions (BIS 2006). 
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tax income. This implies that the post-tax return to paying down the mortgage will 
generally exceed the post-tax return on investing in financial assets, providing an 
incentive to pay down the mortgage rapidly if possible. Such an incentive 
encourages the use of variable-rate mortgages, which are less likely to involve 
prepayment penalties. 
Specific tax concessions can influence the structure of ownership of the dwelling 
stock. For example, real estate investment trusts (REITs) in the US qualify for tax-
free status provided they distribute most of their earnings to shareholders and fulfil 
certain other conditions. This increases the incentive for at least some of the 
private rental stock to be owned and managed by institutions rather than individual 
landlords. In countries such as France and Germany, there are concessions 
designed to encourage the construction of rental housing, particularly in the market 
segment serving low-income households (see Scanlon and Whitehead 2004 for 
more details). 
Despite the clear incentives for certain patterns of funding and financing embedded 
in tax systems, it is difficult to show a simple mapping between features of taxation 
systems and macro outcomes such as debt-income and housing price-income 
ratios. This is because the tax regime interacts with the other aspects of the 
housing–finance system in sometimes complex ways. Some of these other features 
are discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2  Structure of the Financial System  
Households in different countries access mortgage finance at widely varying terms. 
As summarised in Table 4, loan terms can vary from 15 to 45 years. The maximum 
allowable loan-to-valuation ratio (LTV) also differs substantially, as does the 
typical LTV for new loans.7 Variable-rate loans predominate in some jurisdictions, 
while in others fixed-rate loans are more important. The term of the fixed rate need 
                                           
7  The typical characteristics of loans offered in other markets vary even more widely than for 
the peer group shown here. Loan terms are generally shorter in emerging markets (for 
example, 10–15 years in Mexico and 3 years in Korea) and have more stringent down 
payment requirements, but these features are generally converging towards those seen in the 
major economies. A similar pattern of historical development was evident in mortgage 
markets in industrialised countries (Green and Wachter 2005). 
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not be the same as the term over which the mortgage loan is amortised and this 
difference can vary across countries. 
Table 4: Contract and Funding Features in Selected Mortgage Systems 















Australia  25  60–70    ~85  For fixed rate  Extensive 
Canada  25  75–95  29  Some fixed rate  Extensive 








Netherlands  30  87 (max 125)  26  Some fixed rate  Extensive 
NZ  25–30  80–85  16  For fixed rate  Very limited
Sweden  30–45  80–95  98  For fixed rate  Limited 
Switzerland  15–20  80  33  Some fixed rate  Limited 
UK  25  70  95  For fixed rate  Some 
US 30    ~85 25  None  Extensive 
Note:  ‘Variable-rate’ includes loans fixed for up to two years for most countries shown except NZ, for which
only fully floating-rate mortgages are included. 
Sources:  NZ – RBNZ estimates; other countries – BIS (2006); Green and Wachter (2005); national sources; see 
notes to Table 3 in BIS (2006) for more detail 
 
A few common cross-country trends emerge nonetheless. Countries where 
mortgage interest payments are not tax-deductible for owner-occupiers tend to 
have systems where the predominant mortgage type is either a variable-rate loan or 
loans with interest rates that are fixed for a relatively short period compared with 
the contract term. This is partly an endogenous response to the tax incentive 
described above, which creates an option value on the ability to make prepayments 
if possible.8 There is also some tendency for the average LTV to be lower in these 
countries than in those where deductibility is possible, as can be seen from a 
comparison of Australia and the UK with the Netherlands and the US. This also 
seems to be the conclusion drawn from the experience of the UK, where the 
deductibility of owner-occupied mortgage interest was gradually removed over the 
                                           
8  This is not a universal trend, however; in some countries not shown in Table 4, such as Spain, 
prepayment penalties also apply to variable-rate loans (BIS 2006). 
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1990s, and the prevalence of high LTV loans fell accordingly (Hendershott, Pryce 
and White 2002). 
Mortgage deductibility is also implicated in the tendency of borrowers in some 
countries to adopt products like endowment mortgages; these are an interest-only 
mortgage attached to an account that works like a managed fund. The idea is that 
the returns on the accumulated assets are more than sufficient to repay the loan 
principal at the end of the loan term. This can only work if the post-tax return 
exceeds the interest rate paid on the mortgage debt that would otherwise have been 
paid down, which is more likely if mortgage interest is deductible. It is therefore 
no surprise that this type of instrument has lost popularity in the UK, become more 
prevalent in the Netherlands, and has essentially never been adopted in Australia. 
In addition to tax systems, differences in other government regulations and 
interventions have influenced mortgage markets, particularly the development of 
funding markets. For example, in many jurisdictions, legislative and regulatory 
support was needed before securitisation of mortgage loans could occur. In some 
countries, such as the UK and some in continental Europe, mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) or mortgage bonds (which have similar properties to MBS) have 
required enabling legislation setting out the rights and responsibilities of issuers 
and bond holders. In others, such as Canada and the US, government support for 
securitisation markets has been crucial to their development. The Canadian 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation is a government-owned agency responsible for 
insuring mortgages. In the US, the so-called government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were founded to support mortgage markets 
and the expansion of homeownership. In both countries, these publicly supported 
agencies have been instrumental in supporting the MBS market by setting 
standards for underwriting and, in the case of the US GSEs, holding significant 
MBS on their balance sheets.9
Many other national differences in outcomes have simply reflected the endogenous 
developments of products and conventions in the light of historical practice and 
                                           
9  Green and Wachter (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the historical development 
of the US mortgage market and its peculiar features; see Courchane and Giles (2002) for a 
comparison of the historical development of the US and Canadian mortgage markets and 
associated government interventions. 
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competition between lenders. The past decade or so has seen substantial innovation 
in the range of mortgage products available, and in the ways that these products are 
funded, as was already described in Section 2.1. These changes have tended to 
result in more households having access to more finance than had been the case 
previously. 
In particular, there has been a tendency towards allowing higher LTV ratios. That 
is, households do not need to make as large a down payment as in the past. This 
has been an important development, since as disinflation and deregulation allowed 
households to service larger debts, the down payment required to do so would also 
have increased substantially relative to income. If this down payment constraint 
had not eased at the same time as the repayment constraint was eased, the effect on 
housing prices and household sector indebtedness would probably have been 
smaller (Ellis 2005). 
The institutional framework in the financial sector has influenced the extent of 
mortgage product innovation in individual countries. For example, the role of 
technological innovation in driving product innovation has been most apparent in 
the United States, where the dominant presence of the GSEs and the widespread 
practice of mortgage originators securitising their loan books have encouraged 
development of data-driven credit scoring and automated underwriting practices 
(BIS 2006). These innovations have occurred to a much lesser extent in countries 
where lenders tend to keep loans on their own balance sheets and therefore face 
weaker incentives to package loans into standardised types with consistent degrees 
of credit risk. 
Changes in the structure of the financial system have been important drivers of the 
evolution of the mortgage markets of particular countries. For example, as 
mentioned in Section 2, the entry of a new class of lender in Australia in the 1990s 
resulted in lower interest rate margins, new products such as low-documentation 
loans, and innovations in funding such as the wider use of MBS. Similarly, the 
entry of banks into the UK mortgage market in the 1980s and 1990s increased 
competition in a market that had previously been dominated by building societies. 
The demutualisation of several major building societies may also have contributed 
to this increased degree of competition. By contrast, one reason why there has been 
less product innovation in some of the major European mortgage markets could be 
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that there has as yet been little cross-border competition or examples of lenders 
breaking into new markets in neighbouring countries (BIS 2006). 
3.3  Legal System and Housing Policy 
Government policy affects housing markets beyond the measures specifically 
relating to the financial system. Government interventions especially influence 
structural features of the housing market, including the owner-occupation rate, who 
owns rental properties, and the types of housing in the rental segment. This can 
affect housing prices and household balance sheets if different types of owners 
have different motivations and borrowing capacity. Table 5 summarises some of 
the relevant features for a selection of countries. 
One of the most important differences across countries is the importance of the 
social housing sector, including public housing owned directly by government and 
housing owned and managed by non-profit organisations, charities and enterprises 
associated with municipalities. Social housing removes an entire segment of the 
dwelling stock from ownership by the household sector, with obvious implications 
for the size and composition of balance sheets and the sector’s sensitivity to 
changes in housing prices. In countries with large social housing sectors such as 
Sweden and the Netherlands, many of its tenants include middle-income 
households that might have been owner-occupiers in other jurisdictions. By 
contrast, in countries with low shares of social housing such as Australia and the 
US, this housing type tends to be highly targeted to low-income and disadvantaged 
households, who have lower propensities to own their own homes. 
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Table 5: Legal and Institutional Features of Housing–Finance Systems 









 1980  2002–2004 Latest    
Australia 71 72    5  No Almost  absent 
Canada  62  66    6  Some provinces  Some REITs 
France 47  55    19  Cost-based  1.2%  non-social 
Germany  41  42    6  Continuing tenants  ~15% total stock
Netherlands 42  54    35  Yes  Social  housing 
NZ 73  68    6  No  Almost  absent 
Sweden 58  61    21  Yes  Mainly  municipal
Switzerland 33  35   2  Cost-based  ~⅓ rental stock 
UK  65  68    20  Social only  Social housing 
US 58  69    3  Some  REITs 
Note:  Social housing shares are for 1997 (Sweden; municipal housing), 1998 (Netherlands), 1999 (Australia),
2000 (Switzerland), 2001 (Canada, Germany), 2002 (France, UK, US), 2004 (NZ). 
Sources:  adapted from BIS (2006); European Parliament (1996); Scanlon and Whitehead (2004) and national 
sources 
 
Government regulation of the landlord–tenant relationship, including imposition of 
rent controls and regulating the terms under which tenants may be evicted, clearly 
influences the supply of private-sector rental housing. Rent controls reduce their 
responsiveness to current market conditions and generally reduce rental returns. 
For example, deregulation of rents in the UK and the introduction of Assured 
Shorthold Tenancy encouraged the expansion of the rental market in that country. 
Figures from 1998 showed that net rental returns on properties that were still 
covered by the old arrangements were less than two-thirds of the returns available 
on properties under assured shorthold tenancies (Crook and Kemp 2002). 
Similarly, restrictions on landlords’ ability to evict bad tenants or sell the property 
when they want will increase the riskiness of investing in rental property. This 
raises returns required to encourage additional stock to be made available to the 
rental market, thereby constraining the supply of rental properties. 
Housing policy can also affect incentives for different parts of the private sector to 
own the rental properties, and the type of housing that they own. Specific 
incentives or requirements to invest in rental housing for low-income households 
have been important throughout Europe and North America (Scanlon and 
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Whitehead 2004); supply of some amount of low-cost housing is sometimes a 
condition of planning permission for residential developments. On the other side of 
the market, encouragement of homeownership has been an explicit policy of 
successive US governments for many decades. This was the motivation for the 
creation of the GSEs, as well as for many smaller-scale efforts such as the 
subsidisation of construction of properties for the owner-occupied market; there is 
evidence that the latter have boosted both ownership rates and housing values in 
neighbouring areas (Ellen et al 2001). 
Another feature of the legal system that can influence the pattern of housing 
ownership is the way that title to property is allocated and divided. In particular, 
small-scale ownership of rental property by individual landlords is more likely 
where individual apartments in a block can have different owners; for example, 
what is known as condominium structure in most jurisdictions, or strata title in 
Australia.10 Even where ownership of condominiums is possible, other aspects of 
housing policy and the legal system can discourage small-scale landlords. In 
Canada, the authorities’ housing policies are directed towards ensuring sufficient 
supply of so-called ‘conforming’ rental stock – that is, dedicated blocks of 
apartments that are all rented out. Other types of rental stock such as individual 
condominiums and detached houses are termed ‘non-conforming’ and are 
discouraged, partly because of concerns that these dwellings might be withdrawn 
from the rental stock at a later date (Clayton Research 1998; Crook 1998). 
These policies can have unintended consequences, both in the housing market 
directly and in terms of macroeconomic outcomes. Rent controls and other 
measures designed to support tenants can sometimes work to their disadvantage, as 
they raise required rental returns to investors and restrict supply. For example, the 
focus on ‘conforming’ rental property in Canada seems to have resulted in 
relatively high costs of renting compared with owning and very low rental vacancy 
rates (Traclet 2005), but very little new supply of apartments (Crook 1998). 
                                           
10 Even if some sort of condominium structure does not exist, as was the case in the UK until 
2004, it can still be possible to have separate ownership of apartments, but there must be a 
residual owner of all the land under the apartment block. 
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3.4  Geographical Features 
The physical characteristics of a country can affect the outcome of an increase in 
housing demand brought about by greater availability of finance. Because most 
people in industrialised countries live in urban areas, housing outcomes can be 
affected by the characteristics of the cities themselves, including their location, 
geographical spread and density, and perhaps also by the structure of the 
relationships between cities. 
Traditional urban economics has antecedents in the von Thünen model of rural 
land rent and crop distribution. This literature assumes cities have a single 
employment centre to which residents commute each day from their homes further 
out (Mills  1967; Muth 1969). In this model, living at the fringe of the city is 
generally less desirable than in the centre because commuting times are greater, so 
housing prices are lower at the fringe. This pattern is observable in the data for 
most countries;11 Table 6 shows the ratio of inner-ring to outer-ring prices for the 
major cities in Australia. Although there was some tendency for inner-suburban 
property to become relatively more expensive during the turn-of-the-century price 
upswing, overall these ratios seem fairly stable within cities. There is a slight 
tendency for the difference to be greater in the larger cities, although Melbourne’s 
price differential would seem out of line with that relationship.12
                                           
11 But not all countries: in the US, for example, suburban locations have often been preferred 
because they allowed higher-income households to avoid city taxes and inner-city schools, 
while retaining access to the same metropolitan amenities and job market. When US cities 
have reverted to the more usual situation of inner-city properties being more expensive, it has 
sometimes been cause for comment (McMillen 2002). There are also some non-US cases of 
inversion of the land-price gradient, that is, where outer areas are more expensive than inner 
areas, such as Haifa in Israel (Plaut and Plaut 2003). Some recent research has focused on the 
development of town centres at the fringe of existing cities (for  example, Garreau 1992; 
Glaeser and Kahn 2001; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg 2002). 
12 This might be an artefact of the Real Estate Institute of Australia’s definitions of inner and 
outer suburbs. 
 21 
Table 6: Australian Metropolitan Median House Prices 
Ratio of inner-suburban to outer-suburban median prices; December quarter data 
City  1998 2002 2005 
Sydney  2.19 2.16 2.01 
Melbourne  1.72 1.82 1.79 
Brisbane  1.65 1.68 1.89 
Adelaide  1.52 1.99 1.85 
Perth  1.70 1.97 1.95 
Sources:  Real Estate Institute of Australia; author’s calculations 
 
When cities are more spread out, it is harder to provide efficient transportation 
over the whole city, so the costs of traffic congestion become relatively greater at 
the fringe than if the city had been more compact. This would suggest that the 
price gradient from inner areas to outer areas should be steeper for more sprawled 
cities with poor transport options.13 The effect of the steeper price gradient on 
average city-wide prices is ambiguous: it could imply either cheaper housing at the 
fringe relative to the fringes of other cities, or more expensive inner-city housing. 
Most evidence from the US suggests that average housing prices are lower in more 
sprawled cities; as a simple illustration of the point, Figure 5 in the next section 
shows that prices are quite low in the canonical urban sprawl of Atlanta, compared 
with other large cities. However, sprawled cities generally differ from denser cities 
in other ways as well. The denser cities are usually older, larger and more likely to 
be constrained from expansion by coasts and other natural barriers 
(Fulton et al 2001). As such, at least some of the higher density is probably an 
endogenous response to the costs of commuting and congestion in large cities, 
while some of it can be accounted for by exogenous geographic factors. 
On the other hand, sprawl usually occurs when land availability is greater, so plot 
and dwelling sizes can be larger at the fringe than would be possible in more 
compact cities. Realised prices of outer-suburban housing might therefore be quite 
high in sprawled cities, but a regression controlling for housing quality would still 
identify a steep price gradient. Table  7 shows that countries where overall 
population densities are lower and cities are more sprawled, such as Australia and 
                                           
13 Consistent with this, improved transport to the outlying areas was one of the suggested causes 
of the land-price gradient inversion in Haifa cited by Plaut and Plaut (2003). 
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the US, generally have larger dwellings with more floor space than countries with 
higher population densities and more compact cities.  
Table 7: Selected Demographic and Urban Stock Characteristics 
  Total population 
density (2001)
(a)
Average size of 
existing dwellings 




2 Per cent of housing stock 
Australia 2.5  131.8
(c) 85.6 76.5 
Canada 3.3  114.0  66.4  55.9 
France 107.1  88.0 56.2  na 
Germany
(b) 230.5 86.7  45.6  31.0 
NZ 14.3  132.0
(d) 83.0 73.0
(d)
UK 243.8  84.0  80.7
(e) 25.6 
US 30.8  156.5  66.7  60.6 
Notes:  (a) For whole country 
  (b) German housing stock data refer to West Germany only 
 (c)  Excludes  public  housing 
  (d) Detached house and floor space data refer to Auckland only 
  (e) House data refer to England only 
Sources:  reproduced from Berger-Thomson and Ellis (2004); Ellis and Andrews (2001); RBA (2003b) 
 
Another aspect of the role of urban density and the type of dwellings in the housing 
stock for national outcomes is that certain dwelling types are more conducive to 
institutional versus individual ownership of the private rental stock. Institutions are 
more likely to seek to reap the economies of scale in property management by 
owning whole apartment blocks or housing estates. In countries such as Australia 
and NZ, where the dwelling stock is disproportionately comprised of detached 
houses, these scale economies are not available, and individual households are 
more likely to be landlords than is the case in some other countries. 
Whatever the effect of city density on housing prices in the long run, more 
sprawled cities probably show less tendency towards short-run price surges in 
response to increased demand for dwelling numbers, for example when population 
growth increases. This is because the more sprawled a city is, the greater is the 
proportion of detached single-family homes in the housing stock, as opposed to 
apartments. The logistics of detached-house construction are much simpler than for 
a multi-storey apartment block, which requires deeper foundations, lifts and other 
more complex engineering elements. So although detached houses consume more 
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land than the same number of dwellings in the form of apartments, they can usually 
be built more quickly. Supply will therefore be more responsive to demand for 
extra dwellings. This may explain why Berger-Thomson and Ellis (2004) found 
that the estimated supply curve for the number of dwellings in the UK is steeper 
than in Australia, the US or Canada, where population density is lower and 
detached housing is a larger share of the housing stock.  
This greater responsiveness to an increase in demand for extra dwellings will make 
little difference in the face of a surge in demand for the entire stock of housing as 
described in Section 2. The construction of additional properties at the fringe of a 
city does not do much to supply in response to an increase in the demand for 
average housing services per property, that is, average housing quality. To the 
extent that the newly built properties are of the currently desired quality but 
existing properties are not, some households might be induced to sell their existing 
home and move to a newly built one. Vacancy rates in the established areas would 
rise as a result, with the older, lower-quality homes either renovated or demolished 
and replaced over time. It seems that this would result in a slower process of 
adjustment than simply renovating the existing dwelling stock. On the other hand, 
it is quicker to demolish and replace detached houses than whole apartment blocks, 
so the renovation process might also be quicker in more sprawled cities. 
The implications for prices of a demand surge might be different if the country has 
only a few big cities, rather than a network of many smaller cities. In general, the 
larger is a city’s population, the more expensive is its housing. This is a well-
known result from urban economics (Gabaix 1999). Large cities offer advantages 
in terms of the range of jobs and products available because the size of the market 
is larger (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 2001; Fujita and Thisse 2002). There may 
also be productivity spillovers from living in large or dense population centres 
where there are more people and firms to learn from – so-called Jacobian 
externalities (Jacobs 1970); Kohler and Smith (2005) present evidence that wages 
and housing wealth are both higher in more densely populated areas.14 In 
equilibrium, these advantages must be balanced by the disadvantages of living in a 
big city. Otherwise, the population of one city would all move to one that is more 
attractive in net terms. Congestion costs such as traffic jams and crime are one type 
                                           
14 See also Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Glaeser and Maré (2001). 
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of disadvantage that supports the equilibrium population distribution, but housing 
costs are a particularly powerful disincentive against cities becoming too large. 
This implies that the distribution of population between cities has a compositional 
effect on aggregate household balance sheets at the very least; a population 
concentrated in a few cities will result in higher national average housing prices 
and assets (Ellis and Andrews 2001). Moreover, if there is only one large city, the 
positive externalities of urban living cannot be provided by alternative locations. 
An upswing in housing demand in that city cannot easily be siphoned off by 
households moving to other cities where housing is cheaper. 
4.  Policy Issues 
Housing prices have risen substantially in many countries over the past 15 years, 
both in the English-speaking world and in a number of countries in continental 
Europe. Related to this, household indebtedness (the ratio of debt to income) has 
increased substantially in most major economies. This expansion in household 
balance sheets has raised some concern for policy-makers. Lower inflation, 
reduced financial regulation and ongoing competition and innovation have allowed 
higher debt burdens. Even if most or all of the expansion so far has been a rational 
response to a new equilibrium, there is a risk that households or lenders may 
succumb to over-exuberance and a tendency to extrapolate past price gains into the 
future. On the lending side, there is evidence that financial institutions in some 
countries have eased lending standards at the same time as households have been 
able to borrow more. It is therefore of interest to disentangle how much of the 
increase in household indebtedness and gearing against housing represents a 
normal reaction by borrowers and lenders to the easing of constraints and 
regulation, and how much implies an increase in their risk profiles. 
Even if systemic risks to the financial system have not increased, these 
developments have implications for policy-makers’ understanding of 
macroeconomic behaviour. There is a growing body of literature suggesting that 
the easing of financial constraints makes household spending more sensitive to 
shocks, not less (Almeida 2000; Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe 2002; Debelle 2004, 
for example). Similarly, city-level evidence from the US suggests that households 
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respond more to income shocks when the average LTV ratio is high (Lamont and 
Stein 1999). It is therefore important for policy-makers to have good information 
on how the transmission of shocks might be changing. 
4.1  Need for More and Different Data 
To assess the implications of these developments in household balance sheets for 
macroeconomic and financial stability, policy-makers are finding that they need to 
expand the types of data they analyse (BIS 2006; Schwartz et al 2006). In 
particular, disaggregated information about household financial positions and 
stresses is likely to become increasingly important. This is because it is not the 
average household that will experience distress in the event of a shock, but rather 
those households at the tails of the distribution. At this stage, the conclusions 
drawn from analysis of disaggregated data are fairly benign. For example, stress 
tests using Swedish data (BIS 2006) and analysis of disaggregated data on balance 
sheets of Australian households (for example, RBA 2003a; Ellis, Lawson and 
Roberts-Thomson 2003; and Kohler and Rossiter 2005) suggest that the holders of 
housing debt in Australia and elsewhere are those most able to afford it. 
In addition, if balance sheet developments have a stronger influence on household 
spending than in the past, identifying turning points in housing prices will be of 
greater concern for macroeconomic analysis than previously. This means that the 
quality of housing price indicators will become increasingly important. In 
Australia, the RBA has put considerable resources not only into analysing existing 
indicators, but also into encouraging data providers to improve the range and 
quality of their data. Some of the outcomes of these efforts included the 
introduction of a new set of mix-adjusted house price indices (Prasad and 
Richards  2006) and a deeper understanding of repeat-sales and hedonic price 
indices (Hansen 2006). Also largely in response to the RBA’s advocacy, many data 
providers shifted to reporting house prices using the date of sale as the reference 
period, rather than the date the transaction was reported to land titles agencies. This 
improves the usefulness of the data because it relates the price to the period in 
which the price was agreed. 
Data improvements not only help policy-makers, but might also assist private 
decision-making as well. The increased use of data-driven risk assessments 
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through credit scoring implies that data quality has become increasingly important 
for lending and underwriting decisions. For this reason, there may be positive 
externalities to efforts by policy-makers to improve data. 
4.2  Old Rules of Thumb for Balance Sheets Might be Misleading 
As has been discussed earlier in this paper, much of the expansion in borrowing 
has been a response to reductions in inflation, financial market deregulation and 
financial product developments that have all allowed borrowers to manage larger 
debts. These are permanent changes. Ratios of debt or housing prices to income 
should therefore not be expected to revert to past historical averages, and it would 
be a mistake to enact policies designed to bring this about.  
It would also be misleading to assume that past relationships between household 
balance sheet variables ought to reassert themselves. Ratios of household debt to 
assets have been much more stable over recent years than the ratios of debt and 
housing prices to income shown in Figures 3 and 4. This is because they are not 
affected by the mortgage tilt effects of disinflation. But they have nonetheless 
increased, as households have responded to the removal of financial constraints 
that resulted from deregulation and increased competition. 
Old rules of thumb about individual mortgages have likewise been rendered 
obsolete. As lenders have used a wider range of information to ascertain different 
borrowers’ credit risk more precisely, the amounts they are willing to lend are no 
longer linked to repayment-income ratios or loan-to-valuation ratios in a simple 
way. Particularly in North American markets, simple ratios have given way to 
credit scoring and risk-based pricing, so that loan sizes and pricing are more 
closely tailored to individual borrowers’ circumstances. To the extent that this 
reduces the margin of safety for some borrowers who are now able to borrow more 
than the older practices would have implied, this might mean that more households 
are facing greater financial risks than previously. But overall, this easing of 
financial constraints is a reflection of their ability to repay and withstand those 
risks. Therefore it cannot be assumed that a shift away from the earlier lending 
practices based on rigid ratios implies that financial vulnerability has increased in 
any significant way. On the other hand, most credit-scoring models have been 
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based on data drawn from the unusually benign experience of recent history, and 
have not been tested in more turbulent times. 
4.3  Limited Effect of Extra Marginal Supply 
In some countries, particularly Australia and the UK, the upswing in housing 
prices has made it difficult for young households to achieve homeownership. At 
times, this has become a contentious issue, with various interested parties arguing 
that regulations and other frictions have brought about an affordability crisis by 
preventing an expansion of supply at the fringes of cities.15 But such an argument 
fails to distinguish between an increase in the number of dwellings demanded, and 
an increase in demand for average quality of dwellings. If income growth, 
demographic change or immigration is boosting the number of households, there 
will clearly be demand for extra dwellings. However, this is not the main cause of 
the expansion in housing demand and mortgage borrowing seen in recent years. As 
shown in Table  2, it is simply physically infeasible for new supply to expand 
enough to have accommodated the expansion in households’ capacity to pay. 
Instead, there have necessarily been large increases in the cost of housing and land. 
This is not to say that government regulation has not had a role in determining the 
level of house prices. As mentioned in the previous section, cities that are more 
sprawled do seem to have lower house prices. However, they are not immune from 
price cycles (Chinloy 1996), or from the level shift in equilibrium housing prices 
that occurs when inflation falls and financial sectors are deregulated. It seems 
indisputable that government regulation can increase housing prices (Glaeser and 
Gyourko 2002, 2003), but regulation designed to prevent sprawl is not the only 
kind that does so. Regulations setting high minimum standards for housing quality 
or block size, or preventing medium-density and apartment development – which 
effectively enforce sprawl – also raise prices (Schill 2002).16 As an illustration of 
this, Figure 5 shows that Portland, Oregon, which is widely cited as a case where 
planning policy has been inspired by anti-sprawl ‘Smart Growth’ ideas, does not 
appear to have particularly high housing prices compared to other cities of 
                                           
15 See, for example, some of the submissions made to the 2003 Productivity Commission 
Inquiry into First Home Ownership in Australia, at <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/housing/ 
subs/sublist.html >. 
16 This is not to say that such regulations do not provide other social benefits. 
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comparable size. In addition, the cumulative price growth in the recent upswing 
has been much less there than for some fast-growing cities where sprawl has 
occurred, such as Las Vegas and Phoenix. This example is not intended as a 
substitute for a thorough econometric investigation, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper.17 Nonetheless, the facts suggest that allowing for more spread out cities 
or, more generally, untrammelled supply of extra dwellings, would not have 
prevented a large increase in Australian housing prices over the past decade. 
Figure 5: US House Prices by City – 2003 

































































































































































 ●  Smaller cities – population <1.5 M
■ ■ ■  Large cities – population >1.5 M  
Sources:  National Association of Realtors; US Census Bureau 
The debate about the role of housing supply highlights the fact that the expansion 
in housing prices and debt has meant that issues previously considered to be 
specific to housing policy now have implications for macroeconomic policy. 
Policy-makers may need to become more expert in topics they previously 
considered outside of their portfolio in order to evaluate claims and debates that 
have some bearing on macroeconomic and financial developments. 
                                           
17 At least part of the variation in price growth across cities reflects differences in population 
growth, that is, the contribution of demand for extra dwellings. 
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4.4  Rising Indebtedness 
The most important lesson to draw from recent international experience is that a 
run-up in housing prices and debt need not be dangerous for the macroeconomy, 
was probably inevitable, and might even be desirable. As emphasised by the BIS 
Committee on the Global Financial System’s Working Group report, the expansion 
in household borrowing has in many cases reflected better pricing of risk and credit 
scoring, implying that credit is being allocated more efficiently than in the past. 
This should improve the economy’s resilience to adverse shocks. In addition, the 
product innovation summarised in Table  1 implies that households now have 
greater choice about the kind of mortgage they take out, which ought to be welfare-
improving (BIS 2006). 
If a macroeconomic downturn were to occur, it could be exacerbated by a 
correction of an extended housing boom. However, the experience of Australia and 
the UK seems to suggest that booms in housing price growth can subside without 
themselves bringing about a macroeconomic downturn. In Australia, nationwide 
average housing prices fell for around two years from about the end of 2003. 
Household consumption growth did slow during this period, but from rates that 
were unsustainably strong (Figure 6). The picture for the UK was similar, even 
though it did not benefit from the cushioning effect on incomes from the sharply 
rising terms of trade, as Australia experienced. 
These relatively benign outcomes point to the underlying robustness of the 
financial systems in these economies. Even where there was evidence of 
speculative demand (or panic buying), and an apparent belief in some quarters that 
housing prices never fall, households adapted to the turn in the market reasonably 
well. Although there have been anecdotal reports of home buyers experiencing 
negative equity, it seems that much of this can be attributed to the normal 
idiosyncratic risk inherent in a heterogeneous product like residential housing. 
In contrast, consumption slowed more sharply in the Netherlands when housing 
price growth slowed there.18 However, the slowdown in consumption was not 
caused directly by households reacting to housing prices; rather, both 
                                           
18 See, for example, Box B ‘The Housing Market Slowdown in the Netherlands’ in the RBA’s 
September 2004 Financial Stability Review for more discussion of the Dutch experience. 
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developments were driven by a more general macroeconomic slowdown brought 
about by other causes, namely the slowing in Germany and other trading partners. 
There seems to be little evidence that households that have rapidly expanded both 
sides of their balance sheet will autonomously decide to contract it again, cutting 
back on their consumption and thereby generating a general economic slowdown. 
Rather, it seems households only re-evaluate their balance sheets when they are 
forced to by a macroeconomic slowdown. While this may not be a desirable 
pattern of behaviour in cases where household balance sheets are in genuine need 
of repair, it might provide some comfort that an economy-wide contraction is not 
the inevitable outcome of a substantial increase in property prices. 
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